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Abstract 
For 4E cognitive science, minds are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. 
Proponents observe that we regularly ‘offload’ our thinking onto body and world: we 
use gestures and calculators to augment mathematical reasoning, and smartphones 
and search engines as memory aids. I argue that music is a beyond-the-head 
resource that affords offloading. Via this offloading, music scaffolds access to new 
forms of thought, experience, and behaviour. I focus on music’s capacity to scaffold 
emotional consciousness, including the self-regulative processes constitutive of 
emotional consciousness. In developing this idea, I consider the ‘material’ and 
‘worldmaking’ character music, and I apply these considerations to two case studies: 
music as a tool for religious worship, and music as a weapon for torture. 
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<1>Introduction 
4E approaches in cognitive science see mind as embodied, embedded, enacted, 
and extended. They observe that we routinely ‘offload’ our thinking onto body and 
world. Tilting our head to make sense of a rotated image or text, for example—
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instead of rotating an internal representation—reduces information-processing 
demands (Risko and Gilbert, 2016). Similarly, we use gesture to represent solutions 
to mathematical problems (Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, and Wagner, 2001), 
sketchpads to scaffold artistic creation (Loughlin, 2012), models to better understand 
scientific theories (Toon, 2015), and smartphones, search engines, and cultural 
institutions to support memory (Gallagher and Crisafi, 2009). These beyond-the-
head targets of our offloading generate ongoing feedback loops that transform our 
cognitive profiles in real-time and, in so doing, help us negotiate complex cognitive 
tasks. From a 4E perspective, understanding how minds work requires looking 
beyond heads and taking into account the different ways bodily, social, and material 
resources scaffold access to new forms of thought and experience (Clark, 2008; 
Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011). 
4E theorists have recently turned to music cognition: from work on music 
perception (Clarke, 2005; Kersten, 2014; Krueger, 2009, 2011a; Leman and Maes, 
2015; Matyja and Schiavio, 2013) and musical emotions (Cochrane, 2008; Krueger, 
2014a, 2014b; Schiavio, van der Schyff, Cespedes-Guevara, and Reybrouck, 2016; 
van der Schyff and Schiavio, 2017; Witek, Clarke, Wallentin, Kringelbach, and Vuust, 
2014), to improvisation and music education (Elliott and Silverman, 2015; Geeves 
and Sutton, 2015; Schiavio and Høffding, 2015). In this chapter, I continue this trend. 
I argue that music, like other tools and technologies, is a beyond-the-head resource 
that affords offloading. And via this offloading, music can (at least potentially) 
scaffold access to new forms of thought, experience, and behaviour. I focus 
especially on music’s capacity to scaffold emotional consciousness, including the 
self-regulative processes constitutive of emotional consciousness—although I will 
say some things about how music can scaffold other cognitive processes, too. In 
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developing this idea, I consider two aspects of music that have been largely 
overlooked in the philosophical literature: its ‘material’ and ‘worldmaking’ character. 
And I apply these considerations to two cases studies: music as a tool for religious 
worship, and music as a weapon for torture.  
<1>Music as material for worldmaking 
Philosophers often portray music, along with the practices by which we engage with 
it, as largely distinct from everyday life. For example, Peter Kivy argues that the 
liberating power of music comes from ‘its complete freedom from connection with our 
workaday world and its problems’ (Kivy, 1997, p. 209). Alvin Goldman defends a 
similar view. He assumes (‘without further comment’) that the social dimension of live 
music, for instance, is ‘not a primary value for most concert goers’ before defending 
his central claim that music is more detached from the real world than other art 
forms, and that this detachment is ultimately the source of the great value we place 
on music and musical experience (Goldman, 1992, p. 35).  
While we might engage with music in this relatively ‘worldless’ manner—I can 
put on headphones, turn off the lights in my bedroom, and lose myself in a solitary 
musical experience—it does not follow that this is our default way of engaging with 
music.1 Moreover, the worldless picture of musical engagement that Kivy and 
Goldman endorse is not well-equipped to capture the situated character of our most 
common musical practices, many of which involve others—such as listening while 
worshipping, studying, exercising, or deliberately using music to enrich an individual 
or collective emotional experience. In these and many other cases, music is 
something we interact with and bring into use (Clarke, 2005; Krueger, 2011a, 2015a; 
                                                          
1 Even these solitary forms of listening, however, are not truly ‘worldless’. They occur in specific listening 
contexts, and involve artefacts, practices, associations, and preferences that reflect the listener’s sociocultural 
ecology and shape how they perceive and interpret the music (Clarke, 2005, pp. 126-155).  
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Menin and Schiavio, 2012; Rentfrow, 2012). In other words, we encounter music as 
material—an ‘aesthetic technology’ (DeNora, 2000)—that we put to work in actively 
driving experience and behaviour.   
Consider portable listening technologies like MP3 players and smartphones, 
along with the streaming music services that flow through them (Bull, 2000). These 
are portable and personalized technologies for on-demand ‘self-care’ (Skånland, 
2013). We use them to craft transient, site-specific soundworlds specifically to 
regulate emotional consciousness, whether at work, play, or rest. And because we 
have these technologies with us constantly, musical interactions are no longer 
infrequent occurrences; they are never more than a touchscreen away. If I feel my 
energy flagging and need an affective boost to propel me through a strenuous 
workout, I can scroll through my MP3 player until I find just the right track, or simply 
issue a voice command telling my smartphone to play some upbeat music (Fritz et 
al., 2013). Similarly, if the energy begins to drop at a party, a well-chosen track can 
instantly revitalize the atmosphere and animate dancing and further conversation. 
Because music is materialized in an array of portable technologies, it is thoroughly 
interwoven into everyday activities—from reading and writing to cooking, exercising, 
shopping, socialising, worshipping, resting, and commuting.  
So music is something we do things with. And one of things we routinely do 
with music is construct and organize space. In other words, we make musically-
structured environments to inhabit, explore, and manipulate (Bull, 2007). This 
‘worldmaking’ dimension of music flows from its materiality. Because music is 
materialized in aesthetic technologies, we can use it to manipulate physical and 
social spaces—again, think of playing specific music to set the right atmosphere at a 
party, or in a waiting room, restaurant, or retail space—as well as create 
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individualized soundworlds nested within these spaces. For example, office workers 
in shared or open plan office settings routinely use music to construct ‘auditory 
bubbles’ (Dibben and Haake, 2013; Eriksson, Atienza, and Pareto, 2017). These 
private soundworlds reclaim individual space, block out environmental distractions by 
creating a preferred auditory environment conducive to work, and provide resources 
to help manage attention, affect, and energy.   
The spatial or worldmaking power of music also comes through in how we talk 
about music and musical experience. For example, when talking about pitch 
organization—a uniquely musical feature—we rely on spatial contrasts like ‘up and 
down’, ‘high and low’, ‘small and large’, etc. (Eitan and Timmers, 2010; Morgan, 
1980). Spatial and movement metaphors are also central in descriptions of our 
strong emotional responses to music: ‘sad music helps you enter your own true 
feelings’ (Peltola and Saresma, 2014, p. 298); ‘suddenly I was in some inexplicable 
way drawn into the music. It felt as if I was somehow lifted up from my seat and sort 
of floated in the room…’; ‘The music crawled inside me; or was it me that crawled 
inside the music? In some way that was all that existed’ (Gabrielsson, 2011, pp. 79–
80).      
These descriptions should be read as more than metaphors. They highlight 
the extent to which the experience of space is a constituent feature of musical 
consciousness (Krueger, 2011b). The phenomenologist Maurice-Merleau-Ponty was 
attuned to this spatial or worldmaking character of music, as when he wrote:  
a piece of music comes very close to being no more than a medley of sound 
sensations: from among these sounds we discern the appearance of a 
phrase and, as phrase follows phrase, a whole and, finally, as Proust puts it, 
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a world. (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 99) 
In the concert hall, when I reopen my eyes, visible space seems narrow in 
relation to that other space where the music was unfolding just a moment 
ago, and even if I keep my eyes open during the performance of the piece, it 
seems to me that the music is not truly contained in this precise and shabby 
space. The music insinuates a new dimension across visible space where it 
unfurls just as, for persons suffering hallucinations, the clear space of 
perceived things is mysteriously doubled with a ‘dark space’ where other 
presences are possible. It brings a new dimension stealing through visible 
space, and in this it surges forward… (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, pp. 257–258)  
A way of interpreting Merleau-Ponty’s potentially cryptic remarks here is to 
see them as his attempt to distinguish two forms of spatial content intrinsic to 
musical consciousness—both of which are important for understanding music’s 
worldmaking character and its ability to manipulate emotions, as we will see below. 
On one hand, we hear music as an event located in the environment. This is to 
perceive music’s locational spatial content—to hear music as coming from 
somewhere in ‘visible space’, as Merleau-Ponty puts it (e.g. the stereo in the next 
room, the tinny smartphone speaker three rows behind me on the bus, or the audio 
system of the car driving by my house). Locational spatial content specifies music as 
an event situated in the environment, located in relation to listeners and other things 
and events. Because music bears locational spatial content—and is materialized in 
artefacts like MP3 players, speakers, and instruments—it can be selectively 
positioned in the world and used to alter its structure (recall the ‘auditory bubble’ 
example above). 
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But Merleau-Ponty also highlights a second form of spatial content intrinsic to 
musical consciousness particularly relevant to present concerns: the inner structural 
space of music. This inner space is a property that individuates music qua music in 
contrast to other sound events in the environment. For example, while we also tend 
to hear other sounds as bearing locational spatial content—I hear the hum of the fan 
by the window, the whine of the washing machine in the laundry room, or the 
laughter of children playing in the grass outside my office—music becomes present 
to consciousness in a different way. We hear it as also having a distinctive internal 
spatial complexity. It is perceived as a structurally organized soundworld that can be 
inhabited, experientially, in a way many other sounds cannot.2 What this means is 
that we hear musical elements like tones, melodies, rhythmic progressions, and 
textures as meaningfully arranged to hang together in a particular sort of way. This 
‘hanging together’ establishes a musical event’s distinctively musical profile, its 
coherence as a musical event. And it renders music meaningful insofar as it 
immediately shows up for us not as random noise but as a phenomenologically rich 
sounding environment intentionally crafted to invite different forms of perceptual and 
behavioural engagement (Clarke, 2013; Reybrouck, 2015). Phenomenologically, the 
dynamic interplay between locational and structural musical space is, I suggest, a 
central reason why music becomes present to consciousness with its distinctive 
character and meaning.3  
                                                          
2 Of course, this may not equally be the case for all forms of music such noise music or avant-garde 
electronic music consisting of pure tones, electronic signals (feedback, distortion, tape hiss), or music 
with a minimal or randomly-generated structure (e.g. a few irregular blips or industrial sounds 
punctuated by long stretches of silence). Alternatively, non-musical field recordings of natural or 
artificial landscapes may, like music, also become present to consciousness as rich sounding 
environments inviting further exploration. Part of the philosophical curiosity of music and sound comes 
from trying to account for these sorts of challenging cases.  
3 These considerations also help clarify why amusiacs—who show a deficiency processing pitch 
variation despite normal speech perception and intact sense of rhythm—tend to describe music as 
unpleasant, unstructured noise (McDonald and Stewart, 2008; Sacks, 2007). There is evidence that 
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In sum, our experience of music qua music involves the perception of musical 
space, a musical world. Moreover, because music is mediated materially (for 
example, by aesthetic technologies), we can do things with it—including 
manipulating the spaces of our environments and, simultaneously, ourselves. By 
virtue of its materiality, music integrates with and dynamically reorganizes physical 
and social spaces, opening up new possibilities for musically-scaffolded experience 
and action. 
 
<1>Offloading and musical worlds 
Music’s material and worldmaking character are what enable music to function as 
beyond-the-head scaffolding that affords offloading.  As will become clear, 
sometimes this offloading is voluntary, and sometimes it is not. Two case studies will 
help clarify this idea: music as a tool for religious worship, and music as a weapon 
for torture. 
<2>Music and worship  
Music has long been central to religious practice (Wynn, 2004). When we enter a 
church, mosque, or temple, we enter not just a religious but also a musical space, in 
which we may find soundworlds fashioned specifically to demarcate that space as 
sacred and to scaffold religious emotions, beliefs, memories, and behaviour. 
There is a well-established connection between music and emotion 
regulation. The latter refers to processes by which we determine which emotions we 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
amusia involves, among other things, an inability to represent space (Cupchik, Phillips, and Hill, 2001; 
Douglas and Bilkey, 2007; Särkämö et al., 2009). When the spatial content of music is no longer 
present to consciousness, music loses its distinctively musical character. For a different view of 
amusia and space, however, see Tillmann et al. (2010).  
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have, when and how long we have them, and how these emotions are experienced 
and expressed (Gross, 1999). Emotions are complex phenomena comprised of 
multiple integrated dimensions: an appraisal dimension, for instance, as well as an 
agentive or action-readiness dimension, a physiological dimension, and an 
expressive dimension (Parkinson 1995). But emotions also have a regulatory 
dimension. And if, as some argue, emotion-regulative and emotion-generative 
processes are inextricable—Frijda (1986); Tomkins (1984)—processes of emotion 
regulation are partially constitutive of emotional consciousness. In other words, how 
an emotion feels reflects the manner by which it is regulated (Krueger, 2015b).   
Traditionally, emotion regulation has been seen as a process that occurs 
almost entirely inside people’s heads (e.g., Gross, 2015). But this individualistic 
perspective overlooks emergent qualities of emotion regulation and experience that 
are scaffolded by an individual’s ongoing engagement with features of their 
environment (Koole and Veenstra, 2015), including their musical environment (van 
der Schyff and Schiavio, 2017). As already discussed, we use music throughout our 
lives and in many different contexts, including religious worship, to regulate our 
emotions (Saarikallio, 2011). We do this because music is an aesthetic technology 
especially well-suited for this task. Its dynamic and temporal nature, along with its 
deep bodily impact on listeners—the fact that musicking enacts continuous feedback 
loops of musical ‘re-soundings’ (Nancy, 2007), from vibrations in our bones and 
muscles to complex patterns of neurophysiological and behavioural entrainment—
means that we are quite literally bodily and affectively captured by the musical 
worlds we construct and inhabit. These worlds pull emotional responses out of us 
and regulate the character of their unfolding.  
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This picture is supported by a great deal of empirical work. For example, 
neuroimaging studies have found that musical responses involve many of the same 
brain regions involved in generating, detecting, maintaining, and regulating emotions 
(Blood, Zatorre, Bermudez, and Evans, 1999; Koelsch, 2014; Overy and Molnar-
Szakacs, 2009). But music affects more than just our neurons. Musicking—whether 
listening alone with headphones, during a religious service, or dancing with 
thousands of people at a festival—is a richly cross-modal and whole-body 
experience involving embodied expressions (facial expressions, gestures, and other 
bodily movements) central to emotional consciousness (Laird, 2007; Maiese, 2011). 
Exploring the details of these processes would take us too far afield (see Krueger 
(2014a) for an in-depth discussion). For now, we can simply note that even when we 
are supposedly ‘passively’ listening, we are still interactively engaged with the music 
at multiple levels of our embodiment: our motor system is involved in processing 
musical rhythms (Chen, Penhune, and Zatorre, 2008; Grahn and Brett, 2007); we 
make spontaneous facial expressions when listening to expressive music, including 
non-vocal music (Chan, Livingstone, and Russo, 2013; Lundqvist, Carlsson, 
Hilmersson, and Juslin, 2009; Witvliet and Vrana, 1996); and we spontaneously 
entrain our movements, gestures, and facial expressions (from subtle head bobs and 
toe taps to full-blown ecstatic dancing) with musical elements like rhythm and 
melody, and in so doing become intimately ‘coupled’ with the music and things 
happening in it (Iyer, 2002; Janata, Tomic, and Haberman, 2012; Witek et al., 2014).  
In this way, then, the musical worlds we inhabit elicit and directly modulate a 
cascade of emotion-specific processes at neurophysiological, behavioural, and 
experiential levels. The important point here is this: via iterative cycles of motor 
entrainment and synchronization unfolding in response to musical features, musical 
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worlds pull emotions out of us and regulate their dynamics in real time as they unfold 
over short- and long-term listening episodes (Elvers, 2016; Janata et al., 2012; 
Windsor and de Bézenac, 2012). Music thus functions as environmental scaffolding, 
that is, as part of our extended (beyond-the-head) emotion-regulatory system. The 
music we play, or that is played around us (e.g., in spaces of worship), becomes part 
of a listener-environment feedback loop that drives, structures, and regulates the 
character and development of our emotional consciousness. This is, I suggest, a 
case of musically-scaffolded emotional offloading. We let music take over self-
regulatory dynamics that would normally fall within the scope of our own internal 
capacities and, via this offloading, let it do some of the emotional work for us 
(Krueger, 2014a, 2014b).  
To make this idea more concrete—and to return to music and worship—
consider music at a religious funeral. The musical soundworld of a funeral has a 
number of functions (Clarke, Dibben, and Pitts, 2010, pp. 1–8). Solo organ music 
before the service masks environmental sounds and demarcates the physical space 
of the funeral as different from the ‘everyday’, provides aural privacy for attendees, 
and guides attention and focus as the service begins. A funeral’s soundworld is also 
selected to scaffold and regulate the experience and expression of appropriate 
emotions. Loud up-tempo pop music would normally be considered inappropriate, 
unless specifically requested by the deceased. So, slower reverent musical works—
Christian hymns like ‘Abide with Me’, for example, or classical pieces like Elgar’s 
Variations, Pachelbel’s Canon in D Major, or Verdi’s Requiem—are chosen for their 
capacity to establish an affective atmosphere gently nudging participants toward 
quiet grief and introspective remembrance.  
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But not all funerals are sombre affairs. Within the Southern Baptist tradition in 
the United States, African American funerals often begin with mournful hymns and 
prayer. But they soon transition into something very different: joyful celebrations of 
the deceased’s reunion with Christ, complete with shouting, singing, and dancing 
that spills out of the pews and into the aisles. These emotional displays are 
scaffolded by up-tempo praise hymns. The musical soundworld organizes and 
guides this transition, actively driving participant’s emotions and behaviours, both 
individually and collectively, as they pass through various phases of this process. Via 
the entrainment responses discussed previously, rhythmic and tonal properties of the 
music pull embodied responses out of attendees directly connected with positive and 
uplifting emotions and regulate how these emotions unfold over the course of this 
episode. This is a full-bodied engagement with musical scaffolding. As Clarke and 
colleagues note, ‘[t]he very act of singing, involving deliberately deep breathing, the 
increased muscle tone associated with standing up, and the concentration required 
to follow the words and music, also bring together physiological and psychological 
phenomena commonly used to help people cope with, and overcome, strong 
negative emotions’ (Clarke et al., 2010, p. 6).   
Other forms of musical offloading can be found within religious contexts. For 
example, music scaffolds social cognitive processes, such as social bonding, by 
synchronizing moods and emotions of a large number of people—again, via the 
entrainment processes discussed previously (Clarke, DeNora, and Vuoskoski, 2015; 
Launay, 2015; Reddish, Fischer, and Bulbulia, 2013). And these musically scaffolded 
moods and emotions in turn regulate the large-scale synchronization of joint action 
and behaviour. This is a central ritualistic function of music. Rituals are patterns of 
organized behaviour that follow a prescribed form. They can unfold at multiple time-
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scales, from moments to years or a lifetime, and can involve a few people or many. 
Music often plays a crucial role in driving the different practices and behaviours 
constitutive of religious rituals. Musical qualities like rhythm, melody, and pulse order 
the temporal sequence of a worship service and organize behavioural coordination 
between participants. They do this by providing external time-keeping cues enabling 
groups to move and act in time, as one (Clarke et al., 2010, pp. 2–3). For example, 
in a Christian service, organ or choral music signals when to sit, stand, kneel, pray, 
or greet one’s fellow worshippers; musical cues also signal the start of the gospel 
reading, tell participants when to approach the front of the church for communion, 
and even determine what sort of actions are appropriate during a particular phase of 
the service (e.g., when walking back to one’s pew after communion versus post-
worship mingling). 
In this way, music encodes action scripts constitutive of a given ritual or 
service of worship. Instead of participants having to remember each and every 
movement or practice, they can offload this responsibility onto the music by letting it 
take over and govern their behaviour. Music thus materializes ritualistic time. Musical 
dynamics are external representations indicating that things are happening right 
here, right now; and these dynamics tell listeners what to do and when to do it 
(Rouget, 1985).  
Canonical music in this way preserves ritualistic practices and action scripts 
over many generations, scaffolding not just individual or even collective but also 
intergenerational memory. Songs, hymns, chants, and sung prayers continually 
remind worshippers of their religious duties and actions; and as we have seen, they 
elicit and regulate appropriate moods or emotional responses. But they also 
preserve and communicate the stories, myths, legends, beliefs, and practices of a 
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religious tradition across multiple generations. Rhythms and melodies chunk words 
and phrases, for example, identify line lengths and stress patterns, and also help 
listeners focus on and recall important words of a text, such as those found in a 
religious scripture or creed (Wallace, 1994). In sum, in addition to its impact on 
emotional consciousness, music is a memory technology that scaffolds processes of 
learning, retrieving, remembering, and reconstructing the rituals and texts 
constitutive of our religious life. 
 
<2>Music and torture 
Inhabiting religious and musical spaces is generally a voluntary and uplifting affair. 
Worshippers create and inhabit these environments in order to enrich their own 
musically scaffolded experiences and share them with others. But not all instances of 
musical offloading have these positive qualities. Music weaponized as an instrument 
of torture is one such case—and it reaffirms music’s potency as affective scaffolding. 
Consider prisons. Prisons are complex soundworlds, and very noisy 
environments. The jangling of keys carried by prison guards, the banging of heavy 
prison doors, the shouting and screaming of guards and unruly prisoners, the 
barking of patrol dogs, and the loud music blaring from radios all contribute to an 
unpleasant soundworld amplified by the austere space of the prison environment 
(Archer, 2002; Carlton, 2007). This takes its toll: long-term exposure to prison noise 
has been linked to deafness (Grossman, Kerr, and Byrd, 1996), and has led some to 
argue that the intensity and unpredictability of prison noise, along with prisoners’ 
relative powerlessness to do much about it, is another form of punishment and 
suppression of their agency (Cusick, 2013; Rice, 2016).   
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However, prisoners can, at times, exert their acoustical agency by creating 
personalized soundworlds with music. Recently, some prisons have given prisoners 
MP3 players as a reward for good behaviour (Kirkpatrick, 2013). They quickly 
become prisoners’ most prized commodity—used to create ‘auditory bubbles’, as in 
office environments, to reclaim individual space, bring order to an unpredictable 
sonic environment, and regulate affect. But prisoners also weaponize these MP3 
players and the soundworlds they create. Loud rap music played through portable 
speakers attached to these MP3 players can be a hostile gesture, a means of 
demarcating territory through sound and deliberately inflicting stress, sleep 
deprivation, and negative affect on others (Rice, 2016). The playing of loud music is 
the most common cause of fights among inmates (Archer, 2002).   
But music can be weaponized in an even more damaging way. It is well-
established that the United States military uses music as an element of ‘harsh 
interrogation’ in the so-called ‘global war on terror’ (Bayoumi, 2005; Cusick, 2013; 
Peisner, 2006). High value detainees are routinely subjected to punishingly loud 
music for hours or days at a time via loudspeakers in individual cells and 
interrogation rooms or positioned just outside communal prison blocks—with 
prisoners often standing or kneeling in an uncomfortable posture. Media accounts 
tend to downplay the severity of these techniques, focusing not on the character of 
the experience but rather on the amusing juxtaposition of artists found in the playlists 
(e.g., Barry Manilow, Slayer, Eminem, the theme song from the American children’s 
programme Barney the Dinosaur). But music is a powerful technology for torture. It is 
telling that victims find the predictability of physical violence preferable to the 
unpredictability of musical torture (Grüny, 2012). 
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To better understand the phenomenology of musical torture and how 
(involuntary) offloading is central to the experience, two points are worth noting. 
First, as Grüny (2012) observes, sounds—particularly musical sounds—seem to 
penetrate consciousness in a qualitatively deeper way than input from other 
perceptual modalities. As he puts it, ‘the audible is organized around degrees of 
intensity, and it seems to imply a rather different relation between activity and 
passivity’ than we find in other experiences (Grüny, 2012, p. 209). If I am in a brightly 
lit room or outside in direct sunlight, say, I can move to shade or cover my eyes and 
enjoy some relief; similarly, I can plug my nose and escape an unpleasant odour or 
shift my body away from an irritating tactile sensation. While we do, of course, have 
some autonomy over the intensity of our auditory experiences, we also seem 
uniquely vulnerable to sounds. This is because we resonate with sounds—
particularly music—down to our bones (Cusick, 2008). Music played at high volume 
bombards listeners’ bodies with relentless acoustical energy, and, as we have seen, 
elicits an array of neurophysiological and behavioural entrainment responses over 
which they have little control and which are directly linked to emotion regulation. This 
aspect of music’s materiality makes it an especially powerful tool for control and 
domination.4     
Second, and relatedly, we often enter and become deeply affected by shared 
musical worlds not of our making. Focusing on MP3 players as technologies of self-
                                                          
4 Of course, we also ‘resonate’, in deep and powerful ways, with input from other perceptual modalities, too. 
There is evidence that smells, for example, trigger intense emotionally-tinged autobiographical and episodic 
memories (Herz, Eliassen, Beland, & Souza, 2004; Saive, Royet, & Plailly, 2014), such as the negative emotions 
experienced by those suffering from posttraumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) (Vermetten & Bremner, 2003). 
However, the multi-level (i.e., neurophysiological, behavioural, and phenomenological) entrainment responses 
that music elicits mean that we are drawn up into musical worlds in a manner distinct from, say, the olfactory 
environments we inhabit. I invite the reader skeptical of this point to imagine being locked in a room with an 
unpleasant odour continuously pumped in via a vent versus being in that same room while music is 
continuously played at a punishingly high volume. Neither experience would be pleasant. But my intuition is 
that the former would be the more bearable of the two scenarios, in part because we can actively modulate 
our exposure to smells (i.e., how much we let inside of us) to a greater degree than we can music.    
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care might lead us to think of musical worlds as primarily solitary environments. But 
as the discussion of music and worship has highlighted, musical worlds are often 
collaboratively constructed environments. And musical worlds created by others 
often co-opt our attention and emotions, and regulate our behaviour in deep and 
subtle ways—even if we are not aware that it is happening. For example, 
background music while shopping influences what consumers buy and how much 
they are willing to pay for their purchases (Areni and Kim, 1991; North, Sheridan, 
and Areni, 2016; Turley and Milliman, 2000). 
To return to music and torture: these cases of weaponized musical worlds are 
powerful examples of what Jan Slaby calls ‘affective mind invasion’ (Slaby, 2016). 
Affective mind invasion occurs when an individual’s affective and emotional 
dispositions fall in line with the interaction routines of their local subcultures. The 
latter refers to things like corporate workplaces, social web-based groups, academia, 
the world of sports, or police and military culture. Over time, individuals within these 
domains adopt idiosyncratic ‘affective styles’: ways of speaking, gesturing, and 
moving, patterns of interpersonal interaction, emotional experience and expression, 
etc., that are normative in the domain in question (Colombetti and Krueger, 2015). 
Individuals are affectively ‘invaded’ to the extent that these styles can regulate 
thought and behaviour without their full awareness or consent.    
Musical torture is a particularly brutal case of affective mind invasion. Part of 
its brutality comes from the fact that aspects of one’s bodily-affective style—and 
emotional consciousness more generally—are not so much reconfigured as they are 
dismantled and destroyed. Prisoners are drawn up into (scaffolded by) a hostile 
musically extended self-regulatory system without their consent. Their subjectivity, 
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their ability to self-regulate thought and emotion, is co-opted and absorbed by a 
weaponized musical world not of their making.    
Reports suggest that much of prisoners’ disorientation comes from the fact 
that music played so loudly and repeatedly is drained of its aesthetic qualities and 
instead becomes an all-consuming violent sound. The individual can no longer 
selectively attend to or pleasurably entrain with qualities like melody or rhythm. 
Instead, their agency is diminished and they are completely subsumed by the music:  
after a while, you don’t hear the lyrics, all you hear is heavy, heavy banging ... 
you can’t concentrate on the drums, or what the person’s saying, all you hear 
is just loud shouting, loud banging, the metal clashing against metal ... It 
doesn’t sound like music at all. (Cusick, 2008, p. 3)  
Another individual describes the isolating character of the experience: the removal of 
access to external cues, such as voices and other sounds, that normally situate us in 
a physical and social world:   
Nothing focused in terms of, like, let me think now of, for example, a topic or 
story. Nothing comes to your head: it’s just that the experience you’re going 
through is so intense...that it takes you away from everything else, everything 
else besides it. (Cusick, 2013, p. 287) 
In contrast to the timekeeping function of music in religious worship, music in the 
context of torture is used specifically to disrupt the subject’s experience of time and 
remove connections with the physical and social world. Even when the music 
eventually stops, the inmate above reports feeling like a cat ‘just turning in a spot, 
saying “What’s going on? What’s going on?”’ (ibid., p.287)  
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Other prisoners affirm the materiality of music as an active force in the world: 
‘You feel like your body is being bombarded with something … It’s like you’re being 
hit with a hammer, din din din din. When it stops, it’s like a beating has stopped’ 
(ibid., p. 288). When played at a high volume for extended periods, music’s 
acoustical energy becomes, Cusick tells us, ‘a vibrating presence of power that can 
deliver a miraculously ubiquitous battering to the sympathetically vibrating bones and 
skin of a man, beating him from within and without, while leaving no marks’ (ibid., p. 
288).  
This process of affective mind invasion destroys the individual’s sense of 
interiority and exteriority, private and public. By forcing the individual to unwillingly 
offload self-regulatory processes onto a hostile musical world not of their making, the 
music removes individual agency and consent. Prisoners are, accordingly, drawn up 
into a musically extended system crafted not to augment and enhance but rather 
dismantle and destroy. 
 
<1>Conclusion 
My case studies—despite their many differences—both highlight the deep way music 
can take over and regulate various processes responsible for the development, 
maintenance, and control of our embodied subjectivity. More specifically, both show 
how self-regulative processes responsible for generating and maintaining emotional 
consciousness can be offloaded onto the musical worlds we inhabit. Sometimes, as 
in the case of music and worship, this process happens voluntarily, within musical 
worlds of our own making; in other cases, however, this offloading is involuntary, and 
involves musical worlds others create for us—and even use against us. Music and 
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torture provides a powerful example of the latter.  Two qualities of music—its 
material and worldmaking character, often overlooked by philosophers of music—are 
what enable music to function as affective scaffolding in this way.    
There are several points in conclusion. First, philosophers of music, I suggest, 
ought to take their lead from music sociologists and psychologists and pay more 
attention to the situated nature of our everyday musical practices—the fact that 
music is something we regularly do things with. One of the main things we do with 
music is actively use it to manipulate our emotional consciousness. This enactive 
way of thinking about music and emotions has only recently found a prominent place 
within philosophical debates. But this is where 4E cognition can help. Broadening the 
scope of inquiry to include not just experiences like attending a symphony orchestra 
but also musical practices embedded in everyday contexts of work, play, learning, 
and rest will benefit from further engagement with 4E cognition, which is committed 
to understanding how the dynamics of cognition and emotion arise within these 
contexts. A particularly fruitful avenue of future research here might be the role of 
music in scaffolding affective processes involved in pedagogy and learning (Elliott 
and Silverman, 2015). For example, there is suggestive evidence that musical 
engagements—both scripted and spontaneous music making, as well as music 
listening and dancing—can play a crucial role in deepening young learners’ self-
understanding, empathy, and sensitivity to their sociocultural milieu (van der Schyff, 
Schiavio, and Elliott, 2016).  
Second, this picture of music as affective scaffolding seems to lend support to 
some of the more radical strands of 4E cognition. These strands include those who 
see a wide variety of psychological states and processes—including consciousness 
and emotions—as partially constituted by beyond-the-head factors. Traditionally, 
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some prominent 4E proponents sympathetic to the idea that cognitive processes 
such as believing and remembering can extend beyond the head via the input of 
environmental resources (e.g., notebooks, smartphones, cultural institutions and 
practices, etc.) stop short of endorsing the idea that conscious states might be 
similarly extended (Clark, 2009; cf. Ward, 2012). However, this reluctance is starting 
to change (Rowlands, 2015; Vold, 2015)—particularly in the realm of emotions 
(Carter, Gordon, and Palermos, 2016; Colombetti and Roberts, 2015; Krueger and 
Szanto, 2016; Roberts, 2015; Slaby, 2014). Given the ubiquity and variety of our 
musical practices, as well as the tight connection between music and emotions, 
music ought to be a core focus of these externalist trends in the philosophy of 
emotions. Musical worlds shape emotional minds. Understanding the latter requires 
looking beyond the head, into the soundtracks of everyday life.5 
 
  
                                                          
5 I am very grateful to Eric Clarke and David Clarke for their thorough comments on earlier versions of this 
chapter. Their feedback greatly improved my thinking about these issues. My thanks also to audiences in 
Berlin, Irvine, and Brussels for helpful feedback on talks related to this material.  
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